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(see versions in Wilson 1966; Berger 1967; Dobbelaere 2002) . A weakening influence of religiosity on vote choice in more 'open' (globalized) societies would provide empirical support to this narrative. The second expectation anticipates the opposite outcome. Specifically, globalization undermines existing certainties, and generates existential and ontological anxiety. To combat this undesirable psychological state, populations retreat to sources of authority and identity that offer certainty, religion being a prime example of such sources (Robertson 1992; Beyer 1994; Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Kinnvall 2004; Held and McGrew 2007) . In this reading, globalization preserves or even boosts the influence of religiosity on individual political decisions. A stronger impact of religiosity on party choice in more 'open' societies would provide empirical support to this narrative.
As a second step, we combine data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey program (CSES Module 2: 2001 -2006 and direct measures of globalization (the KOF indices by Dreher et al. 2008) to produce a robust empirical test of the two competing narratives. Since we do not expect the impact of globalization on the religious vote to be homogenous across countries, we stratify our analysis by national religious context using measures of religious regulation (Grim and Finke 2007) . For a more meaningful interpretation of our findings, we also supplement our analysis with data from the World and European Values Surveys that allow us to establish religiosity trends over time.
The results suggest that: a) country exposure to globalization moderates the relationship between individual religiosity and (right-wing) party choice; b) it does so in an expected direction, according to one of the key narratives: greater exposure to globalization is linked to a stronger effect of religiosity on party choice; and c) this effect might be more intense only for certain religious contexts. The chapter begins with an overview of existing research on modernity, globalization and religion, followed by a discussion of globalization's relevance for religious explanations of political behaviour. We review the datasets and methods, and present findings from a series of logit models. The conclusion discusses limitations of the analysis and key implications of our findings.
The Consequences of Globalization
While the joint investigation of globalization and religion is a growing field of study, empirical research on the consequences of globalization has largely ignored the religious vote. Early scholarship examined the Catholic Church as one of the first global organizations (Valuer 1971) , while more recent works have focused on the role of religion in shaping attitudes towards transnational trade and free-market capitalism (von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003) , and in promoting international development and world peace (Banchoff 2008 ).
Another limitation of comparative studies on religion and political behaviour is that, when discussing the consequences of societal modernization for religion they ignore the globalizing aspect of modernity by using independent variables that measure GDP, income inequality, human development or the size of the industrial sector (e.g. Inglehart While these indicators may be related to globalization, they are not direct measures of a country's exposure to the forces of global economic, political and social openness.
Research that does employ direct measures of globalization as explanations of domestic political behaviour has focused so far on the 'economic vote', that is the economic concerns of voters, rather than on the 'religious vote', which is of interest here (e.g. Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hellwig 2008; see also, Kayser 2007 ).
According to this literature, globalization triggers economic, social and political changes that expose individuals to risk and insecurity. Individuals seek compensation and protection from these risks by turning to the state, particularly to its welfare functions.
The state might be able to protect the individual (for example, through welfare expansion) or might be unable to countenance the negative outcomes of globalization (e.g. outsourcing). In the latter case, citizens might even turn to other, non-economic areas of government performance as their guiding considerations when choosing a party on Election Day. Voters' reactions to globalization, and to the state's reaction in this context, are then translated into electoral decisions. We argue that these reactions can incorporate a religious dimension.
A weaker effect of religion in political behaviour?
While there is a paucity of robust evidence on the religious vote as a function of globalization, extant scholarship highlights two competing hypotheses. The first anticipates that globalization will lead to a weakening importance of religiosity in individual social and political decisions. This expectation draws heavily on modernization theory as reflected in the secularization thesis (this is a vast literature, but see examples in Wilson 1966; Berger 1967; Chaves 1994; Dobbelaere 2002) . It asserts that advanced modernity of the kind promoted by globalization will curtail religion's relevance in the social system, leading to the eventual privatization of religion: faith will bear no impact on citizens' social and political choices. Details follow on the two mechanisms through which globalization might be thought to constrain the religious vote as part of this process.
In economic terms, a globalizing world is often linked to increasing affluence. Globalization has also been connected to how individuals see themselves (Robertson 1992) . In cultural/identity terms, globalization activates population, communication and information flows that build up a pluralistic environment. This allows multiple, often competing sources of meaning and authority to emerge, especially in previously 'closed' cultures. In these cultures, the individual used to interpret his or her existence through a unique (local/national) frame of reference. When exposed to the pluralistic pressures of globalization, a single frame of reference seizes to function as the authoritative meaning system. Multiple sources of information challenge the claims of previously dominant meaning systems -the nation or the church -to an ultimate truth (see the 'sacred canopy' metaphor in Berger 1967 A stronger effect of religion in political behaviour?
The recent reappearance of religious actors in national and international politics challenges the expectation of a religious decline in a globalizing world. This trend coincides with a recent wave of negative reactions towards globalization, ranging from xenophobia and Euro-scepticism to isolationist and protectionist policies. Defying the predictions of the secularization paradigm, religion often appears as a powerful public actor that reinforces such particularism against transnational integration. In this sense, globalization could produce the opposite outcomes than those described in the previous section: it can preserve or strengthen religious authority over the individual. Details follow on the two mechanism through which globalization might be thought to promote the religious vote.
In economic terms, international integration is not necessarily linked to positive material outcomes for ordinary citizens. As many studies argue, globalization may undermine the welfare state and reduce opportunities in the job market, producing 'losers' across countries (Goesling 2001; Rodrik 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Kayser 2007) . By focusing on deteriorating economic circumstances, the 'secure secularization' thesis by Norris and Inglehart (2004) expects that growing income and employment insecurity can lead to a sense of anxiety regarding survival. A turn to religion for spiritual or 1 Although related to Christianity, we use the term "church" to denote any organized religion.
material consolation or welfare is one of the consequences of this negative psychological state (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013) . This retreat to religion is especially plausible when globalization highlights the inability of the state to enforce social protection from negative economic outcomes (Mishra 1999) . In this sense, globalization may lead individuals to embrace alternative sources of authority, such as the church (Tossutti 2002) . For these reasons, cross-border economic interdependence can be seen to urge vulnerable populations to be more responsive towards religious messages. This account expects individuals to be more susceptible to religious authority, including in their political choices.
The role of globalization in religion and politics is more often discussed with reference to non-economic developments (Robertson 1992; Beyer 1994; Casanova 1994; Clark 1997; Haynes 1998; Huntington 1998; Berger 1999; Kinnvall 2004 ). Cultural openness is often seen as a challenge to established identities. It creates a feeling of embattlement. 
The importance of religious context
Which one of these two expectations we actually observe in our data might also depend on local context. The idea that the outcomes of modernity -and by extension, globalization -are not uniform, but depend on historical and cultural idiosyncrasies is a recurring one (Martin 1978; Robertson 1995; Eisenstadt 2000) . For our purposes, we identify a key dimension of local context that might moderate the relationship between globalization and the religious vote: the structure of the religious economy. The relevant scholarship identifies two ideal types as examples of arrangements in the religious economy (Iannaccone 1991 Regarding the variable that we employ to measure globalization, we use data from the KOF index of globalization (Dreher et al. 2008 We recode the original SRI in a way that splits the sample of CSES participating countries into two groups: those in which society is unfavourable towards other religious groups or 'socially closed religious economies' (medium or high SRI score), and those in which society is more comfortable with the presence of other religious groups or 'socially open religious economies' (low SRI score). Since the USA is missing from these reports, we have imputed its score as 'low SRI' (Iannaccone 1991) . Table 1 presents the composition of each group in our stratification. Acknowledging that the SRI taps an informal dimension of the religious economy, we have also replicated our analysis stratifying by GFI, the more legal, administrative dimension that refers to state activities vis-à-vis organised religion. We have also used another stratifying variable from the same dataset, which measures the degree of religious fractionalization or competition that exists among different churches in a given country (how many choices of religious brand available in country).
[ Table 1 about here]
Results Table 2 reports results from multilevel logistic models with random effects. Estimating a pooled data model in the 28 election studies in our sample can lead to erroneous conclusions if there are unobserved differences between countries (Hsiao 2003; Greene 2007 ). Thus we estimate a model that takes into account country-specific effects to ensure that unobserved differences between countries are not driving key findings. We have opted for a random effects estimation, which does deal with some of these potential problems with clustered data (see Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009 ).
[ Table 2 about here]
The first column in Table 2 reports model coefficients for the full country sample.
Columns (2) and (3) reveal that in the lower end of the KOF index (low globalization) the link between religiosity and voting is actually nonexistent (except when KOF is very low). It is only after a certain point (in cases with a KOF score over 67) that this link becomes significant, and actually increases along with the index, as hypothesized in H1b. So the negative sign for church attendance that we observed in Table 2 is present, but as the confidence intervals suggest, it is not significant. And it seems to be driven by countries with an extremely low KOF score (e.g. Albania). This could serve as indication that globalization indeed generates a feeling of embattlement amongst the religious members of a society. The theoretical discussion posited that the emergence of this feeling serves as the triggering mechanism for H1b. In an alternative interpretation, those left behind do not experience any dramatic change in their electoral behaviour, but as a more homogenous group produce this stronger average effect regarding the religious vote. In all, the relationship in Figure 4 does not necessarily suggest that religion is becoming more important in election results. [ Figure 4 about here]
The longitudinal trend produced by data from the World and European Values Surveys (WVS/EVS) is interesting in this respect. Tables 3 and 4 show that there has been a steady decline of religious practice and mass confidence in organized religion across most of the countries included in our analysis. In addition, the few countries that defy this secularization trend, those that register zero or positive change, are not necessarily socially closed religious economies. In other words, religiosity appears to be declining even in those countries in which the regression models documented a stronger positive effect of globalization on the religious vote. This leads us to interpret the moderating influence of globalization in our regression models as follows: within a shrinking constituency of religious voters, those who remain actively religious are more homogenous politically and may be becoming even more so. This is not a case of more people voting for right-wing parties because of religious considerations, but it seems to be a case of religiosity becoming more clearly associated with the right wing as a consequence of globalization.
[Tables 3 & 4 about here]

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the importance of globalization for the non-economic foundations of political behaviour. Combining survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, globalization indices, and structured information on local religious context, the analysis tested two widely theorized, but empirically overlooked expectations. In a conventional reading of the secularization thesis, the globalizing aspect of societal modernization was expected to suppress the importance of religiosity in individual decisions. The opposite expectation held that globalization would heighten feelings of insecurity, which would then strengthen the role of faith in individual choices. We proposed a model that used robust procedures to assess empirically the impact of globalization on the religious vote, that is, on the domestic link between individual religiosity and party choice. Taking into account the structure of the religious economy, we also examined the impact of globalization separately for different types of religious contexts.
The analysis was not without limitations. First, our discussion implies change over the long term, although the survey data at hand only allows for short-term or cross-sectional analyses. Second, while the country-level variables that we employed (globalization and religious economy) cover most countries in the world, the CSES data were limited to those countries that fielded a survey questionnaire, and, among the latter, to those countries that included the (optional) church attendance item. These countries were mostly industrialized economies, and almost exclusively belonged to the historical Christian world. Third, the discussion of the moderating role of religious context makes reference to certain supply-side mechanisms (responses by party elites and religious organizations) that may connect globalization and the religious vote. However, our model focuses on the examination of individual-level considerations. Finally, it has not escaped us that globalization may change the composition of the religious economy itself, for instance by facilitating the transition from a socially closed to an open religious economy. Yet, this type of change is glacial -testing it would require a much longer series of data than the ones presently available.
With these limitations in mind, the models we specified suggested that: a) a country's exposure to globalization indeed moderated the relationship between individual religiosity and (right-wing) party choice; b) it did so in the expected direction (according to one of the key narratives), since higher exposure to globalization was associated with a stronger connection between religiosity and right-wing party choice; however, c) it is not wholly clear whether or in what way this effect was more intense for socially closed than for open religious economies.
Religiosity trends established with data from the World and European Values Surveys provided additional information that facilitated the interpretation of this result. The stronger effect of religiosity on vote choice that was registered in more globalized countries appears to be related to the ongoing decline in religiosity that affects most countries in our analysis. Regarding the wider electoral implications of the findings, these may indicate that a contracting pool of religious voters react against the pressures they face in a globally integrated setting -or at least, that this pool is becoming increasingly homogenous in religious and political terms. Existing research suggests the former scenario may be more likely (see, for example, Beyer 1994; Berger 1999; Tossutti 2002; Kinnvall 2004; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013) .
In all, the presence of a politically concrete religious minority, which is highly homogenous and potentially better coordinated, should be placed within the wider temporal context. In an era of partisan dealignment and growing disconnect between the general public and electoral politics, we argue that the existence of such a group provides powerful incentives to political entrepreneurs, especially from those parties of the right that wish to capitalize electorally on anti-globalization sentiments.
*** 
